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Country Classifications for a Changing World
Dan Harris, Mick Moore and Hubert Schmitz 
Summary
The distinction between developing and developed countries has long been 
central to development studies and to debates on development policy. In earlier
decades, it was in many respects accurate, and was for many purposes useful.
Although the world is still very much divided between rich and poor countries,
relationships among countries have changed so much that the developing–
developed country distinction has become an obstacle to understanding current
problems and opportunities and, even more, to thinking productively about the
future. It is time to stop using it. Many alternative ways of categorising countries
have been suggested. In recent years in particular, large numbers of 
organisations have begun annually to rank countries according to a wide variety of
criteria: from economic vulnerability, bribe payers, competitiveness, digital access,
ease of doing business, food insecurity, governance, and happiness to water
poverty and welfare. These do not adequately capture the structural and relational
changes that have occurred in our multi-polar world with substantially altered
flows of ideas, resources and influence. Focusing on the needs of European 
policymakers, this paper suggests two axes for classifying countries. The first is
the external capacity of states to influence and work with other states. This is 
captured in the (measureable) concept of ‘anchor countries’ developed by the
German Development Institute and beginning to be put into practice in the
enlargement from the G8 to the G20. The second is internal state capacity, as
shaped by the sources of government income, in particular contrasting tax, aid,
and oil. Using sources of public revenue as a way of classifying countries requires
more work but would help to steer the development debate toward the key issue
of improving the quality of governance and thus strengthening the capacity of poor
countries to help themselves.
Keywords: development (general); country classification; country ranking; 
national performance indicators; donor–recipient relationship; taxation; state
capacity; anchor countries; future of the world.
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Executive summary
The central argument of this paper is that the currently dominant ways of 
classifying countries hinder the debate on development policy. They are an 
obstacle to understanding current problems and, even more so, to thinking about
the future. This paper reviews the classifications that are currently in use and 
indicates alternative ways of grouping countries.
A key step in this undertaking is to specify ‘classification for what’? Different 
classifications are useful for different purposes. The issues addressed in this
paper are derived from the bigger project into which it feeds. The Ministry for
Economic Cooperation (BMZ) in Berlin has asked the German Development
Institute (DIE) in Bonn to carry out a future oriented project: to identify the 
long-term trends in the international system that will shape the context in which
development policy is formulated and implemented in the coming decades. What
challenges will European development policy need to confront in 10 and 20 years
from now? What will be the role of organisations such as the Department for
International Development (DFID) in the UK or the Ministry for Economic
Cooperation (BMZ) in Germany?
The original rationale for development policy in general and these organisations in
particular was that there was a developing world which needed help from the
developed world. But the division of the world into developed and developing
countries no longer makes sense. Some developing countries have experienced
the fastest sustained economic growth in history. Others have declined or fallen
apart. In many cases, the relationships between countries have changed so much
that the distinction between donor countries and recipient countries hinders 
understanding. European development policy is struggling to adjust to this new
world, in which changes in the developed world are often driven by changes in the
developing world, notably East Asia. The recent financial crisis, originating in the
developed world, adds to the need to rethink relationships and ways forward. The
debate on how to adjust to these new conditions and deal with the challenges of
the future would be helped by better classifications. 
The search for the new is helped by understanding the old. Section 2 of this paper
goes back to the origin of the developed–developing country distinction. In the
1950s and 60s, this distinction was both convenient for all sides and broadly 
correct with regard to income and international relationships. The relational side
found expression in the distinction between donor countries and recipient 
countries. The bilateral and multilateral relationships assumed in this distinction
are laid out in Section 3 which stresses that there is a tutelary conception 
underlying these relationships. This conception has had a major influence on the
actions and attitudes of government officials on all sides. Much of the 
development debate became aid-centric and the mind frame of many in the 
development business became neocolonial.
Section 4 then analyses why the old donor–recipient relationships have changed
– notably over the last 20 years. The result is a multi-polar world with substantially
altered flows of ideas, resources and influence. This new world is much more
complex and difficult to capture in simple distinctions. This is one of the reasons
why the old developed–developing country distinction continues to be dominant.
IDS WORKING PAPER 326
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Another reason is given in Section 5 which suggests that, in terms of per capita
incomes, the broad distinction between rich and poor countries continues to make
sense even if the membership in the rich country group has increased. However,
the income-metric and relational characteristics no longer coincide, underlined in
the characterisation of China and India as ‘poor and powerful’. But the spectacular
rise of these two countries is just one of the reasons why we need to look for new
classifications.
Section 6 stresses that in recent years many new categorisations and 
measurements have been put forward. The appendix shows the proliferation of
categories that have emerged – most of them very specialised in dealing with 
particular aspects of development. Such proliferation of terms and indicators has
occurred partly because it enhances the prestige of the organisation that puts
them forward. But in some cases the new categories and indicators also have a
practical use, making it possible to compare countries and identify priority areas of
action. Examples include the Doing Business Indicators, the Environmental
Performance Index, the Global Competitiveness Index, among others.
Recognising this multitude of categories and indicators, developed by specialised
agencies for specific issues, is important. While sometimes abused, they 
constitute an advance. They do not however help with the general debate on
development policy.
The final section 7 explores alternatives that could help this general discourse. So
as to ensure that this exercise has policy, and not just academic, relevance, we
start by asking what are likely to be the main future concerns of European 
development policy and, given those concerns, what types of country 
classifications may prove useful. Broadly, two considerations are likely to have a
major influence: first, sharing responsibility in global governance and second, 
finding new ways of helping the poorest countries to help themselves (the ‘classic’
challenge for development policy will not go away). Based on these two themes,
we conclude that country classification based on state capacity, both internal and
external, would significantly add to future debates about European development
policy and suggest two possible models for such classification. We explain why
the anchor country concept, developed by the German Development Institute and
adopted by BMZ, seems suitable for a classification concerned with external
capacity and deserves to be adopted internationally. Finally we suggest a country
classification based on source of state revenue and explain why this would be an
evidence-based way of capturing differences in internal capacity and help shift the
development policy debate in a more useful direction.
1 Introduction
Classifications matter. How we group and label any set of entities certainly 
influences how we perceive them, and probably how we relate to them. Since the
late 1950s at least, a particular classification of countries – a dichotomous 
distinction between ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ – has been dominant within the
development business and prominent in other domains: the mass media; 
diplomacy; school curricula, etc. A range of labels is used to describe this 
09 
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dichotomy. In addition to ‘developed’ and ‘developing’, we have developed and
underdeveloped, donor and recipient, North and South, First World and Third
World. All however signal a major dichotomy between the same two sets of 
countries.
That dichotomous distinction – modified to acknowledge the existence at the time
of a Second World of Communist countries with centrally-planned economies –
dates back to the 1950s. There are two reasons why it became deeply embedded
in language and thought in the 1950s and 1960s. First, it made empirical sense:
most countries did seem to fall into one of three main groups – the First, Second
or Third Worlds – as defined by both internal characteristics and patterns of 
external relations.1 Second, these basic divisions were acceptable or actively
embraced by governments of countries within each category. They were 
convenient, usable for political and diplomatic purposes and, among other things,
consistent with both the ‘development’ and the geopolitical and security concerns
and policies of the main Western/First World aid donors. We all agree that there is
no longer a distinctive Second World of Communist-ruled, centrally-planned
economies. However, we have not yet come to terms with the fact that the 
distinction between ‘developed’/First World and ‘developing’/Third World countries
has become steadily less realistic and useful since the 1970s, to the extent that it
is now seriously misleading. While the previous country groupings have become
much more differentiated and lost their coherence, the world in general, and the
development business in particular, is still to a large degree locked into the old
language.
Are new, useful classifications possible? Two points about that follow almost 
automatically from the fact that the old groupings have become more 
differentiated. First, it is unlikely that any one simple new classification of 
countries into two, three or four groups will prove to be useful for a wide range of
policy purposes. We will not replace ‘developed–developing’ with ‘pinks, blues,
greens and browns’, or anything similar. There is however scope for a range of
classification schemes which help to understand broad development patterns and
help to inform development policy. Second, in this new world where the political
map is more diverse and pluralistic, there are fewer chances that any one way of
classifying countries will be useful to a wide range of governments and other 
policy actors. The governments of Brazil, Iran and South Africa, the managers of
China’s sovereign wealth funds, and Nordic ministers for development cooperation
will be looking at other countries from very different perspectives and with very 
different concerns. They will probably use very different classifications. If it is to be
anything more than an abstract intellectual exercise, any discussion of potential
new ways of classifying countries needs to be attuned to the likely concerns of
particular users. The users we have in mind are European government agencies
concerned with doing something constructive about improving living conditions
and governance in poor countries and improving global regulations and policies
which help to make the world a better place. 
1 We elaborate these two dimensions of country classification further in Section 2, but the internal 
similarities to which we broadly refer include a country’s political system, economic system, income 
level, and economic growth rate, while relevant external features include main trading partners, 
geopolitical relationships, and degree of influence in international economic institutions.
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Organisationally, we are assuming a continuation of recent trends in Europe: 
further integration and cooperation among the ministries and agencies with a
mandate to deal with these issues – notably ministries of foreign affairs, 
development cooperation and defence. We can continue to refer to these 
concerns as ‘development policy’, on the understanding that this indicates
attempts to reduce the adverse impacts of underdevelopment both on the 
immediate victims (poor people in poor countries) and on the world more general-
ly (though connections with terrorism, the narcotics trade, illegal immigration into
Europe, global disease control, piracy, etc).
Our central question then is whether European development policy agencies
should be thinking of classifying countries differently. That seems to beg the 
question of whether any kind of classification is needed at all. Is it not better to
treat each case and country according to its specific situation and character?
Ideally, yes. But there are over two hundred countries in the world, and more than
half of them are likely to be of direct interest to European development agencies.
The staff of those agencies inevitably group countries for some purposes, notably
general policy discussion. They already use a range of other groupings in addition
to the core ‘developed–developing’ distinction. At the very least, they revert to
geographical classification by region, which may be useful in some respects and
problematic in others. Sub-Saharan Africa, for example, is a widely used grouping
that is useful for debates on some development issues, such as contrasting indus-
trial performance with South East Asia, but not for others, like failed states, which
can be found in both regions. It is better explicitly to explore the scope for alterna-
tive classifications than to drift. 
2 The origins of the developed–
developing country distinction
In order to understand the currently prevailing language it helps to go back to the
tripartite classification of countries that began to emerge at the end of the 1940s
as a result of the Cold War. There has never been complete agreement around
(a) the labelling of each category (e.g. should it be the free world or the
capitalist–imperialist powers?) and (b) around where the boundaries should be
drawn (e.g. did China belong to the Second World or the Third?). But, in historical
perspective, it was relatively easy to classify the countries of the world into a small
number of groups on a basis other than geographical location. The reasons? First,
there was a considerable objective reality to the classification, as summarised in
Table 2.1. The countries within each cluster had a great deal in common not only
in terms of the attributes of their individual political and economic systems, but
also in respect of how they related politically and economically to the rest of the
world. Second, the tripartite classification was politically convenient for 
governments. The governments of the First and Second Worlds embraced a 
language that signalled a struggle between their two very different systems and
ideologies. The governments of the Third World, many of them having enjoyed
independence only in the early and mid-1960s, and most of them eager 
participants in the Non-Aligned Movement (founded in 1955), were willing for their
countries to be labelled as different from both the capitalist First World and the
communist Second World, and implicitly identified as both disadvantaged and as a
new and creative force. This ‘Third World’ label was acceptable to the foreign 
policy and defence agencies of First World governments, as well as to their
emerging foreign aid organisations. Competition with the Communist Second
World for political influence was the dominant foreign policy concern in relation to
the rest of the world; use of a single label for that remainder of the world made
sense.
Countries of the First World were rich; capitalist; influential in the main inter-
national economic institutions; relatively highly-coordinated with one another over
international and economic policy issues; broadly similar to one another in their
main political and economic institutions; often exercised a great deal of influence
in some parts of the developing world, frequently on the basis on recent colonial
rule; and could claim to have successfully undergone an experience of 
‘development’ to which the rest of the world aspired. Countries of the Third World
appeared as the polar opposite on every count: poor; weakly capitalist (or anti-
capitalist); weakly coordinated over policy issues (despite enthusiasm for the Non-
Aligned Movement and the United Nations); lacking international influence; highly
diverse politically, economically and culturally; and deficient in ‘development’. The
development debate in the West was mainly about the relationships between the
First and Third World. The most common terminology which then emerged and
‘won’ was ‘developed–developing’ countries. The terms ‘underdeveloped’ and ‘less
developed’ countries were also common for some time but – for diplomatic 
reasons – ‘developing’ prevailed. 
Table 2.1 First, Second and Third Worlds, 1950s and 1960s
11 
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First World
(developed) Second World
Third World
(developing)
‘Internal’ features
Political system Liberal democratic Single-partyCommunist rule
Mixed; rarely
democratic
Economic system Market-oriented Centrally-planned Variable
Income level High Mixed; generally medium Low
Economic 
growth rate High Mixed Low
‘External’ features
Main trading partners Other First World countries
Other Second World
countries First World countries
Geopolitical 
relationship to other
‘Worlds’
Geopolitical 
competition with
Second World; 
colonial power over,
aid donor to, and 
dominant over, most of
Third World
Geopolitical 
competition with 
First World; aid 
donor to, and 
influential in, 
parts of 
Third World
Aid recipient; 
subordinate; but 
actively ‘Non-Aligned’
Influence in main
international 
economic institutions
High Low Low
3 The donor–recipient relationship
In parallel to ‘developed–developing’, the distinction ‘donor–recipient’ became
increasingly common particularly in the policymaking world. Underlying this 
distinction was – and is – an assumption which is rarely spelt out but needs to be
made explicit: the idea of a tutelary relationship between the two sets of countries.
We draw attention to it first, because it shaped attitudes and actions in the 
development business and continues to do so even though actual relationships
have in many cases changed.
The original justifications for the emergence of large foreign aid programmes from
developed to developing were shaped by perceptions of the successful Marshall
Plan transfer of American capital to Western Europe after World War Two. They
focused on the transfer of capital, especially through public sector organisations,
from countries that were believed to be relatively capital-rich to those believed to
be capital-poor. However, the aid relationship expanded, both practically and in
terms of the ways in which it was represented, to other areas in addition to the
channelling of capital and technical assistance, to include general guidance and
injunctions about economic policy, public policy generally, and modes of 
governance. This ‘mission creep’ is no surprise: the extent of the (average) 
differences between developed and developing countries was such that it has
been easy to argue for a ‘development relationship’ much broader than an aid
relationship, with developed countries variously represented as being able to 
provide to developing countries:
l Public sector (aid) capital 
l Private sector (investment) capital
l Expertise in managing the development process
l Strong bilateral linkages, understanding and influence over individual (ex-
colonial) countries
l Collective influence over international and global institutions and 
organisations, to be exercised on behalf of developing countries.
Within developed/aid-giving countries, the notion of a responsibility to transfer real
resources to poor countries has been allied to a notion of responsibility (and
capacity) to guide them to make the best use of this assistance. This became
clearest with the emergence of the good governance agenda in the 1990s and aid
becoming conditional upon improvements in governance (Moore 1993).
There were alternative views. Many people, including a significant academic 
community in the developing world, challenged the implication that the policies of
developed countries were motivated mainly by altruism or broad public interest
concerns. They claimed rather that the governments of the rich countries were
promoting the interests of global capitalism, and trying to advance capitalist/
imperialist exploitation of developing countries. The relationship between the 
capitalist/imperialist core (or ‘metropolis’) and the dependent periphery needed to
be overturned through political struggle (Frank 1966 and 1977; Dos Santos 1970).
Variants of this contrary perspective, generally labelled ‘dependency’ or 
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‘underdevelopment’ theory, received special attention in the 1960s and in Latin
America. Our concern here is not with the accuracy of either of these 
representations of the world, both are useful in some degree. The point is that
even the major radical intellectual critiques were founded on the same 
dichotomous distinction between country groups as the orthodoxy they were
attempting to displace.2 Different labels were applied, but the country groups to
which they were affixed remained the same.
Ironically, many of those holding the alternative views ended up working in the
international and national development policy agencies, in which the
developing–developed and recipient–donor distinction dominated. If this was just
a matter of terminology, it would not matter all that much. But – as shown above–
behind this terminology was what one might term a ‘tutelary conception’ of the
relationship: the more privileged could and should help the less privileged 
countries and at the same time guide them to make the best use of this help. This
conception has had a big influence on actions and attitudes on all sides. Much of
the development debate became aid-centric and the mindframe of many in the
development business became neocolonial. 
4 New relationships require new 
classifications
The bases of the tripartite (First, Second, Third World) and dichotomous 
(developed–developing countries; donor–recipient countries) classifications were
never as static as is implied by the ‘snapshot’ image in Table 2.1. The image is
particularly valid for the late 1960s, once most of Africa had been de-colonised
and foreign aid agencies, both the multilaterals and the bilateral agencies of the
First World countries, had begun to emerge as a distinctive, influential set of
organisations. It is however convenient for present purposes to start from that
period and then examine how the world has changed since the beginning of the
1970s.
The disappearance of the category of Second World/centrally-planned economies
is not a major concern in its own right. It matters to the extent that it contributes to
our major story: the blurring of the differences between developed and developing
countries such that the old labels are now rarely a useful way of summarising
either (a) the structural characteristics of national economies or (b) the patterns of
IDS WORKING PAPER 326
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2 In summarising in this way the ideas of an era, we run the danger of simplifying unreasonably, and 
representing the proponents as simple minded. We are aware that there was much more nuance in 
the debate. For example, some dependency theorists tried to develop a less dichotomous 
categorisation of the world, distinguishing ‘core’, ‘semi-peripheral and ‘peripheral’ countries. Others 
early on employed what was then termed the ‘transnationalisation thesis’ to draw attention to 
processes that later received much more attention in the context of the study of globalisation: the 
extent to which privileged parts of the Third World had close relationships and shared interests with 
sections of the First World (Sunkel 1973). See also the excellent review of dependency theory in 
Palma (1978).
interaction between countries. Conceptually, there are two major dimensions to
this ‘blurring’. First, there is an increasing number of countries that are inter-
mediate between the old ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ categories. This is partly a
matter of the expansion in the number of middle income countries that no longer
receive development aid. More important is the emergence of countries that 
combine characteristics formerly associated either with developed or developing
countries, e.g. low incomes with fast economic growth and considerable 
geopolitical influence. The clearest examples of this new type of ‘poor and 
powerful’ country are India and China (Schmitz and Messner 2008). Second,
globalisation has stimulated a greater degree of economic specialisation, often
evident at the national level, which induces more differentiation within (in 
particular) the old category of ‘developing countries’. They specialise to a lesser
extent than before in the production and export of agricultural commodities. Some
are now major exporters of manufactures, oil and gas, or software. Others 
specialise in offshore financial services, providing migrant labour, narcotics 
production or transit facilities, tourism, a broad spectrum of entrepot services.
High levels of economic specialisation of these kinds often have major impacts on
politics and governance, and considerable implications for how we would wish to
classify countries for purposes of European development policy.
To keep the story clear, we first list the main global political and economic
changes that have impacted on the developed–developing country dichotomy
(change processes), and separately summarise their implications for an attempt
to develop new categories today (outcomes). The change processes are to some
degree interdependent. To the extent that they are separable, the most significant
are.
4.1 Economic growth and its relational effects
At our point of historical departure:
l Developed countries were much richer than developing countries; the 
distribution of income by country was distinctly bi-modal: most people lived in 
countries that were either rich or poor, with few in between.3 First World 
countries dominated international economic institutions and most international
economic relationships.
l Although to some degree challenged by the growth performance of the 
centrally-planned economies in the 1950s, the developed countries were 
widely believed to possess a valuable formula for market-driven, capitalist-
inspired economic growth. This was especially the case in the 1970s and 
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3 The rapid economic growth of Taiwan and South Korea in the 1950s to 1980s, that excited so much 
interest at the time and helped generate a continuing debate on the ‘developmental state’, actually 
had little impact on the politico-economic patterning of the world. These two countries are relatively 
small and, because they are in sensitive geopolitical locations, they have little scope to exercise much 
independent foreign policy influence. In essence, they leapt the income divide between developing 
and developed status, and then the divide between authoritarian and democratic rule, without much 
changing the world around them.
1980s, when the Second World ceased to offer serious rivalry in growth 
performance, and it was not yet clear how much rivalry the poor countries of 
Asia were to provide. Overall, the First World generally could credibly claim a 
‘West is best’ approach to generating economic growth. 
In each respect, the apparent ‘superiority’ of the First World has been eroded: 
l Fast economic growth in Asia has led to some blurring of the former bi-polar 
pattern of income distribution by country. Many more people now live in 
countries with incomes intermediate between the two poles (see Section 5), 
and some of those fast growing large economies, notably China and India, 
now exercise considerable geopolitical and economic power at the global 
level. 
l The locus of fast economic growth has shifted unambiguously from the former
First World. The trajectory has been unstable and uneven, but the overall 
trend has been to faster growth in poorer countries. For most of this decade, 
the economies of most of the developing world, including sub-Saharan Africa, 
have been growing faster than those of the developed world. Much of this 
recent growth, especially in sub-Saharan Africa and, to a lesser extent, in 
Latin America, was induced by the boom in commodity prices stemming from 
fast rates of growth of manufacturing production in China and of economic 
growth in China, India and other parts of South, Southeast and East Asia.4 It 
is unclear how far African economic growth will be sustained now that the 
commodity price boom seems to be over. It is clear that the claim to a generic
‘West is best’ approach to generating economic growth is no longer credible; 
and the trajectory of the 2008 global financial crisis undermines any claim that
the traditional ‘developed’ countries have a special competence in economic 
management at the global or national level.5
4.2 Energy sources
Until World War Two, developed countries collectively were largely self-sufficient
in energy resources: mainly coal, with significant domestic oil production in the
United States. Their dependence on oil from the Middle East (and Venezuela)
increased considerably in the 1950s and 1960s,6 but in a context where the 
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4 For an analysis of how growth in China and elsewhere in Asia has affected other developing countries,
see Kaplinsky and Messner’s (2008) introduction to the special issue of World Development on Asian 
Drivers of Development and other papers in that issue.
5 The forecasts for 2009 suggest that rates of GDP growth are scattered almost randomly across the 
globe. The following national economies are predicted to grow fastest: Qatar, Malawi, Angola, 
Ethiopia, China, Congo-Brazzavilla, Djibouti, Azerbaijan, Tanzania and Gambia; rates of GDP decline 
will be fastest in: Iceland, Zimbabwe, Latvia, Ukraine, Venezuela, Taiwan, Estonia, Ireland, Singapore 
and Britain (The Economist, 20 December 2008, p169).
6 At that time, economic growth was so energy intensive that, before the development of good national 
accounts systems, rates of economic growth were measured by rates of change in the use of 
commercial energy.
governments of the main oil producing states (Venezuela, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia,
Iran, Iraq, Libya) were generally dependent on and subservient to the United
States and Britain in particular. Despite its many distinctive features, the Middle
East was not at that point obviously mis-classified when placed in the developing
world category. Oil wealth had not yet transformed material living conditions for
many people. Most oil exploration, extraction, processing and exporting were
undertaken by the American and Anglo-Dutch oil majors. The (neocolonial)
dependence on the US and Britain was evident. The situation changed as Middle
Eastern political leaders sought to exploit the increasing dependence of the 
developed country economies on oil and the very high rents that could be earned
from control of the industry. When Prime Minister Mosaddeq of Iran nationalised
Western oil assets in Iran in the early 1950s, he was removed from power by an
Anglo-American inspired coup. But the balance of power gradually shifted from
Western governments and companies to local politicians. In 1961, the Iraqi 
government nationalised most of the country’s future oil potential. The nationalist
Ba’ath Party came to power in 1968, and in 1971 nationalised the existing oil
assets of the Western companies. OPEC, founded in 1960, was able to take
advantage of oil shortages in 1973 to engineer production limits, rapidly push up
the price to what were considered crisis levels, and at a stroke transfer something
like 2 per cent of the world’s GNP from oil purchasers into its own coffers. That
set in train two processes that, amid all the volatility of the oil industry (and
increasingly the allied natural gas industry), have continued up to the present.
First, the average rents from oil and gas production have been very high, and
governments have generally succeeded in capturing a very large proportion for
themselves, to the extent that they have become wealthy and potentially very
powerful.7 Second, the large relative decline in the North American contribution to
global oil and gas production (Table 4.1) has been substituted by new sources,
nearly all in areas with few non-energy income sources: Russia, the Caucasus,
Central Asia and parts of sub-Saharan Africa.8
Some oil and gas exporting countries have high average per capita incomes;
some, notably in Nigeria, are very low. Some governments have wasted oil and
gas rents, or used them on armies, weapons and wars. But in all cases the 
governments themselves, through their control over these new resource rents,
have emerged as such powerful actors, domestically and even more 
internationally, that their countries no longer fit sensibly within a developed–
developing country classification.
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7 In the Middle East, most of Latin America and in Russia, national state corporations directly control 
most exploration, extraction, processing and exporting, especially of oil. Foreign companies, now 
including state energy companies from Asia, are more prominent in the natural gas business and in 
sub-Saharan Africa. 
8 In 1970, Nigeria supplied 84 per cent of the oil and gas from coming from sub-Saharan African 
sources. By 2007, it provided only 41 per cent, with Angola, Sudan, Equatorial Guinea, Congo 
(Brazzaville) and Gabon also constituting significant suppliers (BP 2008).
Table 4.1 Regional contribution to global oil and gas production 
(% of world total) (3 year averages, in oil equivalents)
Source: BP (2008).
4.3 Collapse of the Soviet Bloc and the end of the Cold War
The collapse of the Soviet Bloc in 1989–90 did not pose a major direct challenge
to the distinction into developed and developing countries. It did however 
contribute to blurring the distinction in various ways. In the short term, it resulted
in a temporary increase in the number of middle income (Central and Eastern
European) countries receiving Western aid and technical assistance. In the longer
term, it has left a group of middle income former-Communist countries in the
Balkans and the Caucasus that are neither ‘developing’ in the old sense nor 
sufficiently well governed to qualify for membership of the European Union – and
therefore for ‘developed’ status. More important for present purposes was the end
of the Cold War. Geopolitics in the former Third World are no longer shaped by
the pressures of global geopolitical competition between the First and Second
Worlds. To use a common metaphor, the geopolitics of the former developing
countries have ‘unfrozen’. This has contributed, through three main channels, to
the emergence of wider distinctions among them:
l First, the ‘natural’ influence of the larger and more powerful ‘developing’
countries over smaller, less powerful countries within their region has grown. 
The list of new regional powers includes Brazil, India, South Africa, Iran, 
Turkey, Mexico and others. Russia has become a regional rather than a 
global power, but China has become a global power. We return to this issue 
when we discuss the concept of anchor countries in Section 7.
l Second, in sub-Saharan Africa, the relatively clear-cut conflicts over state 
power associated with decolonisation, the Cold War and Apartheid in South 
Africa (Mozambique, Angola, Zimbabwe, Algeria) have largely ended. Instead,
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1970–1972 2005–2007
Oil Gas Oil + gas Oil Gas Oil + gas
North America 26 64 37 17 27 21
South and Central
America 10 2 8 9 5 7
Europe and 
Eurasia 17 30 21 22 37 28
Middle East and
North Africa 42 3 30 36 17 29
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 4 0 3 7 1 5
Asia Pacific 5 2 4 10 13 11
World 100 100 100 100 100 100
sub-Saharan Africa is more divided between (a) relatively stable regions and 
(b) regions blighted by recurrent, complex, resource-driven intra-state and 
cross-border conflicts that are not easily amenable to resolution (especially 
the Great Lakes, parts of West Africa and the Horn of Africa/ Eastern Sahel).
l Third, while Western aid donors have generally increased their total aid, they 
have less geopolitical motivation to spread it widely among middle and low 
income countries (to win ‘Cold War’ friends), and have concentrated it 
increasingly on the poorest countries.9 The extent of the dependence of some
governments on aid for their finances is higher than during the Cold War.
We use the term ‘globalisation’ in its most general sense: the increasing intensity
and frequency of interactions between people and countries in different parts of
the world. The period we are covering here was, until 2008, one of particularly
rapid globalisation, as evidenced in particular in the growth of international trade,
international financial markets and transactions, communications and, more
recently, labour migration. One consequence of these processes of competitive,
market-driven integration of economies across the world has been a relative
decline in trade and other economic linkages stemming originally from colonial
rule. British and French companies, governments, universities and other 
institutions no longer enjoy such privileged connections and influence with former
colonies as they did in the 1960s. They face more competition from American,
Brazilian, Chinese, Nordic, and other counterparts.
The more consequential impacts of globalisation derive from the ways in which it
stimulates economic specialisation by location, and thus the re-allocation of 
economic activities across the globe.10 Much of the commentary on contemporary
globalisation has focused on the spatial reallocation of production activities: for
example, the emergence of major manufacturing hubs in China, agro-production
and processing in Brazil, and software activities in India. That focus in turn leads
to an emphasis on increasing internal spatial economic differentiation within larger
countries in particular and, very often, to the suggestion that national borders are
of declining significance. If that were the dominant economic consequence of
globalisation, then the notion of seeking new and more useful ways of classifying
countries would seem to be misdirected or impossible. However, if we take into
account the full range of processes of locational specialisation associated with
globalisation, we see that they do not all presage the growth of internal spatial
economic differentiation, the decline of state power or the irrelevance of national
borders. Some of them have national rather than sub-national impacts, directly
affect governments and polities as well as economies, and accentuate processes
of differentiation among former developing countries, especially in respect of the
ways in which their governments are financed.
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9 The extent to which this concentration has occurred varies among donors and over time. For an 
analysis of historical trends see Maizels and Nissanke (1984) and for international variation in 
contemporary levels see Baulch (2007).
10 Globalisation has also stimulated increasing income inequality within most developed countries, 
further eroding a characteristic – relative income inequality – that tended in the past to distinguish 
them from developing countries.
The general point is that globalisation encourages some specialisation in 
economy activity by location. In some cases this leads to the diversification of
economic activities within a country. This is especially likely in large countries. The
growth of manufacturing, agro-processing and software industries has diversified
the economies of China, Brazil and India respectively. The growth of labour 
migration and remittance economies has had more mixed effects: it has diversified
the economies of Nepal and the Philippines, but led to something approaching
economic monoculture in many small Pacific island countries that have very little
significant comparative advantage in any type of local production. In other cases,
and especially in smaller states and/or where niche activities require the active
support of public authorities, globalisation has supported national specialisation,
mainly of the following forms:
l Variable combinations of associated high value-added, ‘city state’ activities 
notably entrepôt /transhipment trade; offshore financial activities; high end 
shopping, tourism and entertainment; international shipping registration; and 
secure property ownership and residence (Dubai, Singapore, Doha, dozens of
jurisdictions offshore financial centres – most of which are not states but sub-
state jurisdictions).
l Narcotics production (Afghanistan, Myanmar, Colombia, Peru, Bolivia).
l The narcotics transit trade (that is relatively stable in Mexico and much of the 
Caribbean, and more footloose in West Africa, but currently includes Guinea 
Bissau and, increasingly, Ghana).
l Oil production (see above).
l Receiving development aid (see above).
The implications of these emerging patterns of niche specialisation have been 
little explored. They are likely to have important consequences for (a) the potential
sources of public finance and the incentives faced by governments to tap these
sources; (b) the incentives for political elites to engage in various kinds of state-
building; and (c) government and state capacity generally.
Shifting to a higher level of abstraction, we can reorganise the material above to
define four broad politico-economic processes that have contributed most, since
around 1970, to diminishing the usefulness of the distinction between ‘developed’
and ‘developing’ countries (or donor and recipient, North and South, etc).
l A more pluralistic global political economy: Wealth has become more 
widely distributed among countries. On the strength of various combinations 
of economic and population size, a sustained record of fast economic growth, 
and command of large oil and gas revenues, some countries exercise 
geopolitical, financial and economic influence that they did not enjoy before. 
They increasingly trade, interact and cooperate among themselves, have a 
greater voice in international organisations,11 and in some cases enjoy a 
great deal of international financial influence, partly through sovereign wealth 
funds fuelled through exports of oil, gas and manufactures. China is the 
outlier case, in that it exercises global rather than regional influence, and 
offers a political-economic value system and model of development distinctly 
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different from that promoted by ‘developed’ countries. Even those poor 
countries that remain relatively powerless now have a wider choice of trading 
partners and of sources of private investment and public borrowing, with 
China playing an especially significant diversification role in Africa. 
l ‘West is not best’: Developed countries can no longer claim special 
competence in economic management or promoting economic growth. For a 
long time, this claim derived its justification from the perceived superiority of 
Western models and practices. Now that the East is out-competing the West 
and demonstrating more effective ways forward, using the West as a 
reference point – or the model to live up to – is hard to justify (Schmitz 2007). 
l Niche rentier economies: The increasing specialisation of some countries in
niche activities, shaped by global economic integration, enables governments 
(or political and bureaucratic power-holders operating informally) to finance 
themselves through means other than broad general taxation: rents from oil 
and gas, property development, narcotics production and trade, licensing off
shore financial activities, and aid receipts.
l Governance failures: In some countries and regions, the internationally-
recognised government does not exercise the basic level of control of 
population and territory formerly required under the (Westphalian) inter-
national system, and is instead embroiled in continuous armed conflicts with 
other parties.
The implications of these four broad politico-economic processes for the 
conception of a world divided between aid-giving developed countries and aid-
receiving developing countries is summarised in Table 4.2. The list in the left-hand
column refers to the ‘developmental relationship’ that might have been expected
to exist between rich and poor countries on the basis of the differences between
them in the 1950s and 1960s. It comprises (a) the various ‘developmental inputs’
that rich countries might have been expected to provide to poor countries (see
Section 2) and (b) the implied contribution of poor country governments: 
willingness, ability and motivation to make good use of these developmental
inputs. The stars (*) indicate the points at which the politico-economic changes
summarised above are most likely to call into question this traditional notion of the
development relationship. 
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11 One example of this ‘voice’ is the active role taken by Brazil and India in the WTO, most clearly visible
at the 2003 WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancún, Mexico.
Table 4.2 The impacts of major post-1970 global politico-economic
changes on ‘traditional’ notions of the donor–recipient 
development relationship
(* signifies a significant impact)
5 But it remains a world divided 
between rich and poor countries
The original distinction between developed and developing countries was based
not only on a relatively wide gap between rich and poor countries: this gap also
coincided with characteristic differences both in the internal attributes of nations
(political and economic systems, rates of economic growth) and in their external
relationships (Section2). In recent years, however, it has become less and less
possible to distinguish a group of ‘developed’ and a group of ‘developing’
countries that differ from each other in terms of these internal attributes and 
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Major politico-economic
changes:
More plural-
istic global
political
economy
‘West is not
best’
Niche rentier
national
economies
Governance
failures
‘Traditional’ (1950s and 1960s) conception of potential contributions of developed
countries to the development relationship
Public sector (aid) capital * * *
Private sector (invest-
ment) capital * * *
Expertise in managing the
development process * * *
Strong national linkages,
understanding and 
influence over individual
(ex-colonial) countries
* *
Collective influence over
international and global
institutions and organ-
isations, to be exercised
on behalf of developing
countries
* *
Implicit conception of potential contributions of developing country governments 
to the development relationship
Governments are willing,
able and motivated to
make good use of 
developmental inputs from
rich countries
* *
external relationships (Section 4). Yet we continue to use the ‘developed–
developing’ country distinction. The main reasons seem to be inertia, the difficulty
of creating a simple alternative in an increasingly differentiated world, and the
needs of the aid business. But it is important to note that this distinction still has
some valid empirical basis: if we use figures of average per capita national
income, then we still can sensibly divide the world relatively clearly into rich and
poor countries. This point requires a little explanation, all the more so as the ‘rise
of China’ might in some eyes suggest a major shrinking of the old rich-poor gap.
If we measure the distribution of income among people (regardless of nationality
or location), then we do find a significant change over the past 40 years: the 
pattern is less bi-polar, with more people (the new ‘global middle class’?) in 
intermediate income brackets. That change is however heavily driven, in a 
statistical sense, by one very large country: China (Edward 2006).
If we look at changes in the distribution of income by country, we get a different –
and less certain – picture. One problem is that we do not have comprehensive 
figures and analysis covering the entire period since 2000, which was when the
economies of most poorer countries on average were growing faster than those of
richer countries. The data that we do have suggest two clearly defined trends and
a highly debated third.
5.1 Rising per capita incomes
Broadly speaking, the world has become a wealthier place, even for the poor.
While the growth rates of individual countries have varied widely in the last half
century, the overwhelming trend has been one of positive economic growth.
Global per capita incomes have more than tripled, from $2544 in 1970 to $7958 in
2007 (World Bank 2007). It is clear that, despite periodic stagnation in several of
the poorest countries, most poor countries have shared to some degree in this
growth as evidenced by rising per capita incomes and reductions in absolute
poverty. Some poor countries have even managed to sustain long periods of
growth at higher rates than rich countries.
5.2 Absolute divergence
Despite their growth, poor countries are falling further behind rich ones. A focus on
growth rates alone can be misleading. Even where low income countries display
higher growth rates than high income countries, it is entirely plausible for the
absolute gap between the two country groups to continue to grow. Indeed this has
been the case even during the post-2000 systematic rapid growth in low income
countries and even in the world’s most dynamic economies: China and India.12
On the whole, poor countries may indeed be growing, but given their lower initial
levels of per capita income they are not doing so sufficiently fast to keep up, let
alone converge absolutely, with rich countries. This condition of absolute diver-
gence has characterised changes in the world income distribution for decades
and will continue to do so for years to come.
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5.3 Polarisation
A discussion of the size of the absolute income gap between rich and poor does
not tell us the whole story. A dichotomous system of classification that labels ‘rich’
and ‘poor’ countries suggests not only a significant inter-group gap, but also a
degree of intra-group cohesion. Early work by Danny Quah (1996) and others
suggested a polarised ‘twin peaks’ distribution of world income characterised by
both these processes. Quah argues that over time countries tend to converge not
to a global mean, but around two poles, one high-income and one low-income,
resulting in the bimodal distribution seen on the right side of Figure 5.1. The 
presence of these ‘convergence clubs’ strengthens the case for a dichotomous
system of country classification that distinguishes between rich and poor.
Figure 5.1 Twin peaks distribution dynamics
Source: Quah (1996: 17). (Reproduced with permission of LSE.)
Beginning with Esteban and Ray (1994), a number of studies have attempted to
quantify the extent of polarisation and to measure trends. Their conclusions, 
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12 This divergence is easily illustrated by a simple mathematical exercise. Assuming 10 per cent growth 
in the GNI/capita of China (2007 GNI/capita = $2,360) and India (2007 GNI/capita = $950), results in 
annual increases of $236.00 and $95.00 respectively. A 1 per cent rate of growth in GNI/capita of the 
United States (2007 GNI/capita = $46,040) results in an annual increase of $460.40. Assuming 
constant growth (extremely optimistic given the global reach of the 2008 financial crisis), Chinese per 
capita income would continue to decrease relative to US per capita income for a further 8 years and 
the figures would not converge until 2042. For India the figures are 19 years and 2053 respectively. 
For most low- and middle-income countries, lower rates of growth, lower initial levels of GNI/capita or 
both suggest an increasing gap between rich and poor countries.
 
however, are rather mixed. Seshanna and Decornez (2003) find a steady, 
unidirectional increase in the level of polarisation from 1960–2000 that suggests
the distinction between rich and poor is not only present, but also becoming
increasingly pronounced over time. In contrast, Duro (2005), using more complete
data and a wider range of polarisation measures, finds a curvilinear pattern in
which initial increases in polarisation were followed by decline during the 1980s
and 1990s.13 This finding does not necessarily conflict with the evidence for
absolute divergence if it reflects increased intra-income group dispersion.
However, neither Duro nor Seshanna and Decornez provide a breakdown of the
relative contributions of intra-group concentration and inter-group distance to
polarisation.
The short answer is that we do not yet have a consensus that the traditional 
classification of the world’s countries according to income has broken down to any
great degree. Even Duro’s more optimistic results still indicate a substantial (if
declining) degree of polarisation in the world income distribution. While we 
certainly cannot discount the possibility that polarisation is decreasing, there
remains some justification for a division between rich and poor countries 
according to their GNI/capita. The evidence thus far does not appear to be strong
enough to overcome path dependency in country classification by income and in
the absence of stronger evidence based on more complete data, we can expect
the dichotomy of rich and poor to retain its considerable influence in the 
development discourse.
6 The proliferation of classifications 
and rankings in the current 
development business
The picture we have summarised in Sections 4 and 5 is not simple: a 
dichotomous classification of countries that was once applicable and useful has
lost much of its value; yet the most fundamental statistical fact underpinning that
dichotomy – the existence of a clear, large gap in average incomes between rich
and poor countries – remains valid. It is not surprising that no single new way of
classifying countries has emerged, and that the language of the development
business is still dominated by the dichotomy between ‘developed’ (rich, First
World, aid donor, North) and ‘developing’ (poor, Third World, aid recipient,
South).14 For example, the UK Department for International Development’s 2006
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13 Seshanna and Decornez (2003) use Penn World Tables 5.6 for data from 1960 to 1992 and World 
Development Indicators for subsequent years up to 1999 for 112 countries, Duro (2005) uses the 
Penn World Tables 6.0 from 1960–2000 for 108 countries.
14 There are a number of terms used interchangeably here, including some alternatives we find rather 
obsolete. The most grotesque category is that of ‘industrialised’ countries for the countries of the 
OECD (given that de-industrialisation has been one of their main characteristics in recent years). In 
English, this has become less common but in German, ‘Industrieländer’ remains the most frequently 
used term.
White Paper on international development makes 27 references to ‘poor 
countries’, often drawing a direct comparison with ‘rich countries’ and using the
terms interchangeably with the developing–developed dichotomy. However, while 
dominant, that dichotomy does not enjoy a monopoly: finer categorisations and
rankings of countries have proliferated – either ‘developing’ countries alone,
‘developed’ countries alone, or all countries together. 
Within the contemporary development business, there are three distinct ‘families’
of classification/ranking schema. We label them:
l Income-related classifications
l National performance rankings
l Analytical classifications 
There is some overlap among them at the margin (Figure 6.1), but they are 
distinctive in terms of form, purpose and content.
Figure 6.1 Tripartite distinction of classification systems
6.1 Income-related classifications
The business of ranking and classifying countries according to income levels is so
prevalent as to seem natural. It is intrinsic to the aid business. While national
income statistics are subject to continuous improvement, and we can now choose
alternative measures of national income with different conceptual bases (i.e.
measures of purchasing power parity rather than nominal gross domestic 
product), the core concepts and practices have remained relatively stable in
recent decades. Measures of national income are of considerable practical 
importance in the aid business. First, low incomes constitute the primary 
legitimation of aid.15 Second, individual aid agencies, international financial 
institutions, and other international agencies need continuously to rank countries
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15 There is a significant literature, largely drawing on the work of Dudley Seers, which criticises the use 
of per capita incomes as a metric for development. Seers (1972) suggests this type of income 
indicator could change independently of changes in the true criteria for the realisation of human 
potential, identified by the author as poverty, unemployment and inequality.
by income (or by criteria that are largely income-based) in order to allocate aid
entitlements among potential beneficiaries.
The World Bank has played the leading role in establishing the benchmarks for
eligibility for various sources of development financing. Its policy is that, for 
operational and analytical purposes, the main criterion for classifying economies is
gross national income per capita, with countries classified as low income (<$935),
lower-middle income ($936–$3,705), upper-middle income ($3,706–$11,455) and
high income (>$11,456) countries. A low-income classification, as defined above,
is also the condition for eligibility for the Bank’s Civil Works Preference facility.
Until 2008, a low-income or lower-middle income classification was required for
access to long-term (17-year) loans. In addition to these basic income 
classifications, the World Bank uses an income classification ceiling of $1,095 for
eligibility for highly concessional IDA funding that comprises interest-free loans as
well as grants. Currently 64 countries are eligible for IDA funding because they
meet that criterion, with a further 14 eligible for what is termed ‘Blend funding’
(both IBRD and IDA loans) because they combine low per capita incomes with the
financial creditworthiness to borrow from the World Bank on non-concessional
terms (World Bank 2008). Other development agencies, like the OECD
Development Assistance Committee and the regional development banks, use
World Bank classifications to determine aid eligibility. The African Development
Bank classifies its borrower-members as A, B, or C to signal the degree of 
concessionality to which they are entitled. Categories A, B and C correspond
exactly to the World Bank’s IDA, Blend and IBRD entitlement classifications (Table
6.1).
Table 6.1 World Bank lending category classifications
Source: Asian Development Bank (2008).
In addition to the ‘pure’ income (and income + debt repayment capacity) 
classifications mentioned above, a number of official international organisations
classify countries through combining income and a range of other criteria:
l Highly Indebted Poor Countries – HIPC (United Nations) – income + debt.
l Least Developed Countries – LDCs (United Nations) – income + weak human
assets and economic vulnerability.
l Advanced and Emerging Economies (IMF World Economic Outlook) – income
level + export diversification + degree of integration into the global financial 
system.
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World Bank IDA Eligible World Bank Blend Eligible World Bank IBRD Eligible
AfDB Lending category A AfDB Lending category B AfDB Lending category C
<$1,095 <$1,095 + credit-worthiness
>$1,095 + credit-
worthiness
16 Many of these lists cover almost every country in the world for which there are data, excluding only 
the smallest. Some cover only particular regions or groups of countries.
17 The main exception is the Human Development Index which can be considered a general 
development performance indicator. Some suggest that it should be used as the used as the
development performance indicator. The classification of countries according to high, medium and low 
human development, however, is not widely used in the general development debate. 
l Low Income Countries Under Stress – LICUS (United Nations) – income + 
performance of 3.0 or less on both the overall World Bank’s Country Policy 
and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) rating and on the CPIA rating for Public 
Sector Management and Institutions.
l Low Income Food Deficit Countries (United Nations) – income and food 
deficit.
6.2 National performance rankings
Let us begin with a list of some of the more familiar performance rankings: the
Freedom in the World Index (Freedom House); Transparency International’s
Corruption Perceptions Index; the Doing Business Index (World Bank); the Human
Development and Human Poverty Indices (United Nations Development
Program); the World Governance Indicators (World Bank); the Global
Competitiveness Index (World Economic Forum); the Bertelsmann Transformation
Index (Bertelsmann Foundation); the International Country Risk Guide (Political
Risk Services); the Environmental Performance Index (Yale and Columbia
Universities); the Gender-related Development Index; the Gender Empowerment
Measure; the Global Integrity Index (Global Integrity); the Globalisation Index
(Foreign Policy); the Index of Economic Freedom (Heritage Foundation); the
Competitive Industrial Performance Index (United Nations Industrial Development
Organization); the Failed States Index (Foreign Policy and Fund for Peace); the
State Fragility Index (Center for Systemic Peace); the Science and Technological
Capacity Index (RAND Corporation); the Economic Freedom of the World 
rankings (Fraser Institute); and the Trade and Development Index (United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development). 
What do these rankings – and the (literally) dozens more that are now appearing
every year – have in common? Taking them at face value, we might identify five
defining features.
First, they are normative rankings. Each country is given a ranking so that it can
be compared with other countries and evaluated, either in terms of public policies,
development outcomes of various kinds, or both.16
Second, as the list above implies, these are intended not as general development
performance indicators, in the way that GDP growth is a general indicator, but are
focused on particular themes or policy domains, from industrial innovation through
to the ‘child friendliness’ of public policy, and from the quality of governance
through to the standard of environmental policy.17
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Third, and closely related, most of these rankings are intended as benchmarks to
influence public policy. Much of the underlying purpose is to persuade the 
government of, for example, Indonesia that, because in 2009 it ranks number 129
in the world on the World Bank’s Doing Business Indicator, while Singapore ranks
number 1, and even Zambia ranks number 100, it should be undertaking the
reforms needed to improve its ranking, and thereby improve the business 
environment. In some cases, shame is supposed to play a bigger role: the
Government of Indonesia is expected to come under pressure to reduce 
corruption in the country because, for example, Transparency International’s 2008
Corruption Perceptions Index ranks it at 126, while neighbouring Malaysia stands
at 47.
Fourth, these rankings are based on composite statistics. Country performance is
measured on a range of criteria. These measures are then aggregated in some
way – often simply averaged – to produce the overall score, which in turn 
produces the ranking. For example, the Failed States Index is based on scores
from 1 to 10 in each of 12 domains;18 the scores are simply averaged. The 
production of the World Bank’s World Governance Indicators involves complex
statistical techniques to impute the values of missing observations (Kaufmann et
al. 2008).
Fifth, most are produced annually. 
To understand the significance of these national performance rankings, we need
to look beyond their formal properties. The first point to note is that the number of
such rankings has exploded in recent years (Bandura 2005, 2008). Thanks to
monitoring by UNDP, there is now have a comprehensive listing (see Appendix).
Some rankings listed by the UNDP, such as the various indicators of commercial
risk and sovereign credit ratings do not strictly fall within our purview, as they are
designed to help shape commercial decisions rather than public policy. There is
however explosive growth in rankings of all kinds. The Appendix gives the 2008
update of the UNDP list which includes 178 distinct composite indices. Of those,
84 per cent have been created since 1991. Some of the more recent include; the
Happy Planet Index (Friends of the Earth – New Economics Foundation), the ICT
Opportunity Index (International Telecommunications Union) and the Global Peace
Index (the Economist Intelligence Unit and the Institute for Economics and
Peace). Underlying this rapid growth is an increasing competition between 
organisations: to be the source of the definitive national performance ranking 
indicator within one’s thematic area is a claim to authority and status. For a few
organisations like Transparency International, the release of the annual rankings
is a major media and publicity event. With the exception of a few organisations
like the World Bank that generate two or more indicators, the majority of 
originating institutions produce a single ranking.19
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18 These are labeled: demographic pressures; refugees and displaced persons; group grievance; human 
flight; uneven development; economy; delegitimisation of state; public services; human rights; security 
apparatus; factionalised elites; and external intervention. 
19 Of the 125 organisations generating indices in the 2008 UNDP survey, 98 were responsible for a 
single index (Bandura 2008: 10)
Some of these national performance rankings have received considerable public
scrutiny and critical attention. This includes, for example, Transparency
International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, and the World Bank’s World
Governance Indicators. A particularly thorough and critical evaluation was carried
out by the Independent Evaluation Group of the World Bank on the construction
and use of IFC/World Bank’s Doing Business indicator (IEG 2008). That these
indicators can be very valuable is not in doubt. They permit some very useful
comparative mappings of public policy across countries. Low rankings relative to
neighbouring countries, or others considered to be valid comparators, can be a
more effective way of getting the attention of policymakers than the knowledge
that they do not live up to ‘international best practice’ or OECD standards. At the
same time, it is clear that most of these indicators will remain ‘essentially 
contested’: specialists within particular domains will disagree about both their
accuracy and their usefulness. There are four main types of critiques:20
l Are the data used in the construction of the indices sufficiently accurate?
l How useful is it to rely on the perceptions of expert informants as guides to 
the underlying situation?
l On what basis are the various components used to construct the indices 
actually chosen, and their relative importance weighted?
l What are the potential adverse side-effects of these ranking exercises, 
whether in terms of (a) making it possible for governments to take steps to 
improve their rankings that do not really address underlying problems or 
(b) imposing particular un-evidenced prejudices, or ideologies about what, for 
example, makes economies more competitive?
We acknowledge that the enormous variety of systems of classification, including
those listed in Appendix 1, represent an important advance from the inappropriate
simplicity of the ‘developed–developing’ dichotomy. However, it is important to
recognise that the increasing proliferation and thus choice of indicators has been
driven at least as much by changes in the development business as by more
objective changes in the world. Increasing institutional capacity for thematic 
specialisation, increased statistical capacity, and the need to build organisational
prestige have produced a set of classifications which can help with specific 
concerns but remains unable to capture the new structures and relations in the
real world.
6.3 Analytical classifications
Analytical classifications are employed with increasing frequency, as a reflection
of the decreasing usefulness of the ‘developed–developing’ country dichotomy.
They fall into three main sub-groups:21
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20 See Bandura (2005: 13–14) for a summary of the extensive literature critiquing composite 
performance indices. 
21 One might include Transition Eonomies in this list, but the label is now becoming rather dated: the 
former centrally-planned economies are very diverse.
l First, there are the labels that are applied to sub-sets of countries within the 
traditional ‘developing country’ category to signal that they face specific 
problems, with the implication that they require more aid or special attention 
from the outside world: e.g. Land-Locked Developing Countries; Small Island 
Developing States; Fragile or Failed States.
l Second, there are labels that are applied to former ‘developing countries’ to 
signal that they are becoming wealthy/developed: e.g. Newly Industrialising 
Countries (NICs); Emerging Economies; Emerging Donors; Frontier Markets.
l Finally, there are labels identifying formerly poor and/or geopolitically weak 
countries which, because of the changes in the global politico-economic 
system discussed in Section 4, are, or are becoming powerful at regional or 
even global levels: BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, China); N-11 (Next 11);22 The
Asian Drivers,23 and Anchor Countries.
We find the concept of Anchor Countries particularly useful and discuss it further
in Section 7 which proposes classifications focused on external and internal
capacity of states. Since state capacity has also been a central concern in the
debate on failed states, the classification issues arising in this debate need some
attention here.
Since the end of the Cold War, international organisations and Western 
governments have increasingly been employing terms that explicitly identify 
particular governments of some poorer countries as (a) having failed in some 
fundamental respect and/or (b) therefore being a threat to the rest of the world
because of their inability or unwillingness to control various ‘bads’ emanating from
their territories – conflicts, narcotics, epidemic diseases, trade in arms, piracy,
mass illicit migration, product counterfeiting, terrorism etc. That discussion, and
the concepts and terms used to advance it, are still very much works in progress.
There is much that could be critiqued and criticised. We will concentrate here on
labelling and classification issues.
l Among the various overlapping and competing labels that have been applied 
to the ‘problematic’ poor countries, two relatively distinct types can be 
identified. The first are the labels that refer in particular to failures in 
development performance. These tend to emanate from international aid and 
development organisations. The UK’s Department for International 
Development for some years used the term poor performers, while the World 
Bank employed the (equally allusive) notion of Low Income Countries Under 
Stress (LICUS). The second type of label refers more to the potential for 
governance deficits to cause problems for the rest of the world: fragile or 
failed states.
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22 The N-11 classification includes Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Korea, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan,
Philippines, Turkey and Vietnam. These countries were identified by Goldman Sachs in 2005 as a 
follow-up to their work on the BRICs. Representing the next group of large-population countries with 
the potential for a significant global economic impact, the N-11 classification is far more diverse than 
the BRICs and has yet to gain the same popularity (Wilson and Stupnytska 2007).
23 China and India (Kaplinsky 2006).
l The terms fragile states and failed states seem to be increasingly popular and
dominant. They are conceptually less murky than poor performers or Low 
Income Countries Under Stress.
l There is formally an important conceptual distinction between the terms 
fragile states and failed states that is not always maintained in practice. The 
judgement that a state has failed should refer to an accomplished fact, while 
the judgement that it is fragile implies simply a strong potential or possibility 
for failure. ‘A failed state is one whose government is not effective or 
legitimate enough to maintain the rule of law, protect itself, its citizens and its 
borders, or provide the most basic services. A fragile state is one in which 
these problems are likely to arise’ (Cabinet Office 2008: 14). While empirically
assessments may in some cases be difficult, the distinction is clear. 
l The widely cited Failed States Index, produced annually by the journal 
Foreign Policy and the Fund for Peace is in fact a mixed indicator, covering 
fragility as well as failure. Individual countries are scored according to 12 
(sometimes subjective) measures: demographic pressures; the numbers of 
refugees and displaced persons relative to populations; the extent of group 
grievance; the incidence of human flight; the degree of uneven development; 
the condition of the national economy; the extent of delegitimisation of the 
state; the condition of public services; the extent of human rights violations; 
the power of the security apparatus; the extent to which political elites are 
factionalised; and the degree of external political intervention. The resulting 
list has considerable plausibility. Few observers would disagree radically with 
the 2008 ranking that identifies the following states as the most ‘failed’: 
Somalia, Sudan, Zimbabwe, Chad, Iraq, Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Afghanistan, Cote d’Ivoire, Pakistan and Central African Republic. It does 
however seem anomalous that number 12 on the list should be Bangladesh, 
a country that has long enjoyed very respectable rates of economic growth, 
considerable improvements in mass welfare, low rates of violence and crime, 
and a pattern of governance that, despite the shudders of many external 
observers, appears relatively popular with most Bangladeshis, and capable of
delivering many basic public services. Bangladesh may be a fragile state in 
the sense that there is considerable potential for conflict and disorder. It is not
a sensibly placed high on any list of failed states.
l There is a persistent danger of ‘mission creep’ in the way in which the term 
failed state is employed. If it is not to deteriorate into a mode of routinely 
criticising governments for failing to do one or all of the many things we would
like them to do – achieve the Millennium Development Goals, promote 
economic growth, advance gender equity, ratify and observe any one of 
dozens of international agreements and codes of conduct – then it is 
important that the term be used only to refer to failures to perform the basic
functions of states, e.g. to exercise authority over population and territory, 
provide basic public goods, enforce law and order, and prevent those who 
have power from predating on those who do not. But how easy would it be to 
obtain agreement, in principle and in practice, on what are the basic functions
of states, and how far they extend?
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In sum, we still have some way to go in identifying and using consistent, coherent
concepts to analyse in a practical way the issues around failed/fragile states and
in finding measures of those concepts that are reliable, robust, and adequately
free from of subjective judgement or bias. The discussion in Section 7 of the 
internal capacity of states suggests a way of making progress toward the ultimate
goal through a different route. 
7 Future challenges for European 
development policy: implications 
for classifying countries
The previous sections have shown that, despite a proliferation of specialised 
classifications and rankings, the old developed–developing country distinction
remains dominant. We have shown that there is some justification for this if we
group countries by average per capita incomes, but none if we look instead at
how relationships among different sets of countries are changing in international
arenas. Those relationships have changed so much that the old dichotomy has
become an obstacle to useful analysis, public debate and development policy.
In thinking about useful alternative classifications, it is important to ask 
‘alternatives for whom?’ The concern in this paper is with classifications that would
help in debating future European development policy. While the future is hard to
predict, there is a substantial consensus on the general parameters that will or
should shape future European aid policy.24 It can be summarised in two main sets
of points:
l Interdependence: The means which the governments of rich countries use to 
approach the ‘traditional’ development problem of mass poverty in poor 
countries will become increasingly intertwined with the instruments they 
employ to deal with a range of other concerns over how, in an increasingly 
globalised world, problems left untreated in poor countries and regions can 
impact adversely on the richer world, through global warming, illicit migration, 
narcotics production, terrorism, piracy, epidemic disease etc. In other words, 
aid and development policy will become increasingly integrated with ‘foreign 
policy’ more generally, while ‘foreign policy’ in turn becomes increasingly 
broad and encompassing.
l Networks: In trying to deal with global problems and challenges, the 
governments of richer countries will be obliged to work in a highly networked 
mode with other (newly) powerful agents, often with the aim of changing the 
rules of political and economic games. The cooperation of a range of 
24 Our sources include Shared Destinies. Security in a Globalised World. The Interim Report of the IPPR
Commission on Global Security in the 21st Century, Institute for Public Policy Research, London, 
November 2008 and views expressed at horizon scanning and scenario building workshops which we 
attended at the German Development Institute (Bonn) and at Foresight (London) in late 2008.
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influential countries from among the ranks of the former ‘developing countries’
will be essential, partly because they are increasingly the source of some 
problems (e.g. climate change), partly because it will be difficult to change 
international rules without their cooperation, and partly because they exercise 
influence of various kinds of over smaller, poorer neighbouring countries.
In this context, what classifications of developing countries will be useful for the
European ‘development’ (in the broad sense) policy debate? Income levels will
still matter, as a prima facie indicator of potential need for external assistance.
There will still be more-or-less unpredictable humanitarian crises that will stimulate
large-scale external interventions for a few years. In addition, we believe that two
other axes of classification, both already receiving some attention, are likely to
prove increasingly useful:
l The external capacity of states to influence and work with other states, 
especially other states in their region.
l The internal capacity of states to meet the ‘original’ (Westphalian) criterion 
for statehood: the ability to exercise general (‘sovereign’) authority over their 
population and territory.
These issues – two sides of the same coin – deserve particular attention as they
will be at the core of the general development debate for years to come.
7.1 External state capacity: a classification for regional and global
governance
The terms BRICs and N-11 mentioned in Section 6 represent an attempt to
address the emergence of powerful new actors on the international stage (Section
4). They are however labels for sets of identified countries. The concept of ‘anchor
countries’ is a more useful starting point, because it focuses on the roles that
more powerful countries might play in relation to other countries in their region.
The identifying characteristic of anchor countries is that ‘due to their economic
weight and political influence, they are playing a growing role in their respective
regions, and also increasingly on a global scale, in defining international policies’
(BMZ 2004: 3). We will trace briefly where the concept comes from, what it
means, and bring out its strengths and weaknesses. 
This concept was developed by the German Development Institute in 2004 in
response to the ambition of the German Minister for Economic Cooperation to
play a more active role on the global stage. Traditionally her Ministry had 
concentrated on countries and people marginalised from the global economy or
those who had become victims of globalisation. She and her team felt that the
noble objective of helping these target groups deserved a fresh approach: 
influencing the way global processes unfolded. But how? She was a member of a
Government that had little respect for the unipolar approach of the USA (and its
European ally the UK) and was at the same conscious of its limited influence in
the world. So the Ministry embraced the idea of working with the new emerging
powers. The ‘anchor country’ concept provided a language and an initial 
operationalisation, so essential for translating an idea into action. ‘Anchor
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Countries – Partners for Global Development’ was published as a ‘BMZ Position
Paper’ in 2004.25 Since then BMZ has experimented with this approach, in 
particular in its work with six ‘priority partner countries’: India, Pakistan, South
Africa, Indonesia, China and Turkey.
Few other bilateral donors have gone this far. Some are even contemplating 
withdrawing from the anchor countries, in particular from those that have become
aid donors themselves, preferring to concentrate entirely on the poorest countries
and poorest people in these countries. Meanwhile the difficulty of sticking to this
traditional concept of development policy has become very visible. We have
stressed this before. The point to add here is that successive global crises in
security, food, energy, and finance have led to consultations and summits to which
– grudgingly – anchor country governments have been invited. Interestingly the
economic crisis of 2008–09, which has its origin in the old powers of North
America and Western Europe and threatens to destabilise the global economy,
has brought the decisive – and probably lasting – breakthrough.  A number of
anchor countries have participated in the G20 summits in Washington in
November 2008 and in London in April 2009. 
In other words, the concept of anchor countries has yet to be established 
internationally but the idea behind it is beginning to be put into practice. Inevitably,
introducing a layer of anchor countries will cause controversy and generate
protest from countries which are not given that status. There is an unavoidable
trade-off between effectiveness and direct participation. There is no easy solution
to this issue, but the global economic crisis of 2008–09 has given momentum to
the view that sharing responsibility with anchor countries is an advance on the
practice of the old powers deciding and expecting ‘the rest’ to fall in line.
The concept of anchor countries has strengths and weaknesses. It is an ambitious
way of trying to capture new relationships. Interestingly, early attempts to 
operationalise it are not relational. A country qualifies as an anchor country
depending on the size of its national GDP in relation to the GDP of the 
geographical region in which the country lies. Countries listed on the DAC list of
developing and transition countries whose GDP is either the largest in the region
or accounts for at least 20 per cent of the remaining GDP once the largest 
country’s GDP is deducted are deemed to be anchor countries. This measure,
premised on the belief that large economic size results in a country playing an
important role in economic and political development beyond their own borders,
identifies 15 anchor countries (listed in Table 7.1). The classification makes no
judgment regarding the positive or negative nature of an anchor country’s 
influence but suggests that development cooperation with these countries is
essential to achieving goals in regional or global governance.
At first sight it seems odd to use a conventional indicator such as economic size
(though related to the size of others) as the criterion for a relational concept. A
closer examination, however, suggests that is a reasonably robust way to 
25 The groundwork had been carried out by Andreas Stamm (2005) of the German Development 
Institute. 
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proceed. The great advantage is that it is simple. And there are no obvious 
omissions in Table 7.1. Of course there are some countries that are better
equipped to play the anchor country role than others, notably China, India and
Brazil. At the other end there are at least two doubtful inclusions. Both Pakistan
and Nigeria play important roles in their regions, but are fragile states. In 
considering the usefulness of the concept, it is important to note that an ‘anchor
country’ does not necessarily play an either an active or a positive role in its
region. The concept refers to the potential of influencing other countries and this
potential is measured by relative economic size, as shown above. 
Table 7.1 Anchor countries by region
Source: BMZ (2004), Stamm (2005).
These and other differences between anchor countries need to be acknowledged.
They could be used to discredit the concept. Our view is different. The anchor
country concept can be operationalised easily and helps to steer the development
policy debate in the right direction: away from the old tutelary conception which
underlies the donor–recipient distinction, towards a conception of shared 
responsibility in a multi-polar world. It is true that the capacity of anchor countries
to share responsibility varies. Indeed this capacity varies in extent and kind. Only
few of them have the capacity to contribute to global governance, but all of them
are significant for regional governance. The issues on which they matter also vary.
Egypt is a key mediator in the Middle East but of little relevance in climate change
negotiations. Saudi Arabia is major player in global energy supply but of little
importance in negotiations on global trade rules. More examples could be given.
The key general point is that there are different anchor countries for different
domains.26
An unplanned strength of this anchor country classification is that it includes
seven Muslim countries: Indonesia, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia,
Region Anchor Countries
East Asia and Pacific
China
Indonesia
Thailand
Latin America and Caribbean
Argentina
Brazil
Mexico
Europe and Central Asia
Russia
Turkey
Middle East and North Africa (MENA)
Egypt
Iran
Saudi Arabia
South Asia
India
Pakistan
Sub-Saharan Africa
South Africa
Nigeria
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and Nigeria.27 This is a strength because (a) many of the problems that 
development policy seeks to address are about power and inequality, (b) these
problems often have a religious/cultural dimension, (c) conflicts between Muslim
and other religions/culture have increased since 11 September 2001, (d) it is very
difficult to deal with these religious/cultural issues in a direct way, (e) the anchor
country concept gives the key Muslim countries the status required for sharing
responsibility in regional and global governance – without making religion/culture
the focus of classification and negotiation. 
7.2 Internal state capacity: classification for a tax-centric debate
Let us begin with an extract from the speech made by the Angel Gurria, the
Secretary General of the OECD, at the recent Doha Conference on development
financing:
… I see three compelling reasons for putting taxation at the centre of the
domestic financial resource agenda.
First, taxes provide the long term financial platform for sustainable 
development. Taxes are the lifeblood of state services.
Second, taxation matters for effective state-building. Bargaining between 
governments and taxpayers plays a central role in the emergence of 
democratic governance. Citizens want more responsive government. They
want the state to be accountable for its actions or inaction and taxes are the
vital link between governments and societies. Improved tax relationships
between state, businesses and society have provided a strong underpinning
for broad-based growth and state accountability in East Asia, for example …
Third, taxation combined with economic growth is the antidote to long term
reliance on aid. As my friend Trevor Manuel has famously said, the correct
spelling of the word ‘aid’ is ‘T-A-X’.
This stress on the broader political benefits of government reliance on taxation for
its revenues does not reflect a particular passion or passing concern of the speak-
er or of the OECD as an organisation. It is part of a chorus of concern about the
political and governance implications of sources of government revenue in poorer
countries that has been rising in volume in recent years. In 2008 alone, in addition
to the OECD-DAC document on Governance, Taxation and Accountability (OECD-
DAC 2008), we identified three other policy papers from international think tanks
that made the same kind of argument (Brautigam 2008; Therkildsen 2008;
Graham and Bruhn 2008).28
26 Anchor countries do not necessarily take the same view, or operate as a bloc, as shown by Jing Gu, 
John Humphrey and Dirk Messner (2008) in their analysis of the different ways in which China and 
India participate in global governance arenas. 
27 Labeling Nigeria a ‘Muslim country’ remains contentious. However, with a population that is roughly 
half Muslim, the larger point regarding the importance of sharing responsibility across cultural and 
religious boundaries remains salient. 
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Why this rising chorus of concern about the political effects of public revenue
sources? Let us take first the facts about revenue. For two reasons that we
sketched out in Section 4, the global situation has changed considerably in the
last three to four decades. One reason is the steady growth and geographical
extension of the energy extraction/exporting business, and the very high rents that
can be earned by low cost exporters. A substantial number of governments,
almost all in poorer or middle income economies, now obtain a large fraction of
their income from the rents of exporting oil and gas – and, to a less and more
volatile extent, minerals. The second reason is the growing concentration of 
(generally increasing) levels of development aid on a smaller number of poor
countries. Levels of aid dependence are much higher now than, for example, in
the 1960s, soon after most African countries achieved independence. We do not
have reliable, comprehensive data series on the extent to which either aid or 
natural resource rents currently fund governments.29 We know however the
approximate magnitudes: for example, Adrian Wood recently estimated that, in
2006 and taking into account only countries with a population of a million people
or more, 17 governments (15 in Africa) were receiving at least as much revenue
from aid as from tax, and for a further 13 aid revenues were between 50 per cent
and 100 per cent of tax revenues (Wood 2008).
The facts about non-tax revenue are clear in outline, if still murky in some detail.
What about the implications? These will inevitably be contested: complex causal
arguments about comparative national politics and political economy are hard to
prove when so many other things about the world are changing; and there is 
considerable understandable resistance to any suggestion that development aid,
now largely given for relatively altruistic purposes, might have significant adverse
consequences – in exactly the countries that seem to need it most. It is however
clear that a larger and larger number of people are persuaded by the kinds of
arguments made above by the OECD Secretary-General: not necessarily that
‘more taxation is good’, but rather that the significant dependence of governments
on ‘unearned’ non-tax revenues, like aid and oil, gas and mineral exports, is bad.
Indeed, the case is now quite convincingly made, through case studies as well as
through cross-country statistical analysis, for the impact of oil and gas revenues
(Atkinson and Hamilton 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2005; Neumayer 2004; Ross
1999, 2001; Sala-I-Martin and Subramanian 2003). There are important 
exceptions, including Botswana, to a lesser extent Norway and perhaps now
Saudi Arabia, but in general, over the last three decades, oil, gas and mineral
wealth has generated both economic and political ‘curses’ for the recipients; their
economies have grown relatively slowly and they suffer from oppressive, 
exclusionary (often military) governments that often are not good at maintaining
28 See also the ‘Pretoria Communiqué’ issued by heads of African tax administrations at ‘Tax Africa. 
International Conference on Taxation, State Building and Capacity Development in Africa’, Pretoria, 
28–9 August 2008 (Tax Africa 2008).
29 Some aid receipts remain off-budget and do not appear in national accounts. Most governments 
heavily dependent on aid have or make available very inaccurate and incomplete fiscal information. 
Revenues from natural resources are often kept secret, partly because the governments concerned 
tend to be authoritarian, and partly because they misuse the money. 
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law and order. We do not have such clear-cut conclusions for aid, partly because
aid donors are generally not keen to continue funding oppressive governments
(Collier 2006). The econometricians cannot agree whether there is evidence, on a
country-by-country basis, that high aid receipts appear to discourage governments
from collecting tax revenues. It is however clear to those in the aid business that
tax does appear to governments of poor countries as a preferable option of local
revenue raising. Why risk upsetting your people and pose to yourself serious
organisational challenges if you can get the money more easily by making a 
convincing pitch to an aid donor? It is surely no coincidence that, in sub-Saharan
Africa, the continent of high general aid dependence, government revenues have
been stagnant for more than 25 years once we factor out the benefits to public
treasuries of recent high commodity prices (Gupta and Tareq 2008).
The broader argument about the connections between taxation and good 
government (state capacity, accountability and responsiveness) are made in
Moore (2007), and are summarised in Table 7.2. There are however two important
points to be made about potential responses, in the context of the concerns of this
paper, to the presentation of the ideas in this summary form:
l Our primary concern here is not with the accountability of governments to 
their citizens, but with the effect of revenue sources on (a) the incentives of 
governments and political leaders to behave in certain ways and on (b) the 
capacity of governments to exercise effective control over territory and 
people. To put the point differently, the underlying assumption is that problems
of ‘state capacity’ are to a major degree the result of the (lack of) incentives 
for governments to build the political and bureaucratic capacity to achieve 
certain public goals, not primarily a result of inadequate knowledge, under
standing, education, training or resources.30
l In poorer countries today, the primary mechanism connecting revenue 
sources with the quality of governance lies in the incentives that different 
patterns of funding create for governments and political elites. It does not lie 
in the (uncertain) effects of different types and levels of tax on the willingness 
and capacity of citizens to organise to confront and bargain with government. 
The focal question is not ‘Will an increase of X per cent in the income tax 
burden mobilise citizens effectively?’, but ‘How will a further increase in 
already high aid/oil funding of the government affect its incentives to promote 
private investment, clean up the corrupt tax system, make sure the tax net 
covers the taxable parts of the informal sector and remote rural regions, 
recruit meritocratically to the public service, etc?’.
Future European (broad) development policy needs to be concerned with what we
are calling the ‘internal capacity of states’: their ability – and sometimes implicitly
their willingness – to make effective use of aid resources and to cooperate in
tasks like controlling or eradicating disease, managing migration, or alleviating the
likely adverse effects of climate change. This does not imply a complex process of 
30 These kinds of arguments are made by many specialists in issues of fragile/failed states (e.g. Bates 
2008a and b) and of authoritarian rule (e.g. Corrales 2006). 
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Table 7.2 The effects on governance of state dependence on broad
taxation
Immediate effects Intermediate effects Direct governance 
outcomes
A. The state becomes A. (i) The state is More responsiveness
focused on obtaining motivated to promote
revenue by taxing  citizen prosperity
citizens
A. (ii) The state is More bureaucratic
motivated to develop capability
bureaucratic apparatuses 
and information sources 
to collect taxes effectively 
B. The experience of B. (i) (Some) taxpayers More accountability
being taxed engages mobilise to resist tax
citizens politically demands and/or monitor 
the mode of taxation and 
the way the state uses 
tax revenue
C. As a result of A and C. (i) Taxes are more More responsiveness,
B, states and citizens acceptable and political and bureaucratic
begin to bargain over predictable, and the capability
revenues and exchange taxation process more
willing compliance by efficient
taxpayers for some 
institutionalised C. (ii) Better public More responsiveness 
influence over the level policy results from and political capability
and form of taxation and debate and negotiation
the uses of revenue 
(i.e. public policy).* C. (iii) Wider and more More accountability 
professional scrutiny of 
how public money is spent
C. (iv) The legislature is More accountability
strengthened relative to 
the executive (assuming 
one exists)
* Bargaining is especially likely if representative institutions (legislatures) already exist
Source: Moore (2007: 17).
(a) assessing and ranking states according to some notion – or notions – of state
capacity; or (b) engaging in the inevitable-but-largely-irresolvable consequent
debates about what ‘state capacity’ means, and whether the correct definition has
been used. The task is rather to develop a way of classifying countries in terms of
state capacity that is sufficiently robust and reliable that it will permit the 
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identification, with a high degree of certainty, of the problem cases, i.e. cases
where the government cannot be trusted to use aid funds and/or where it 
exercises such little effective authority with its territory that it cannot cooperate in
the kinds of tasks listed above.
We believe that sources of government revenue will and should be the primary
criterion used to do the initial sorting of states in terms of effectiveness. This 
exercise has never been attempted. The first step could be as simple as scoring
countries according to the following procedure:
per cent of government revenue from general taxation (i.e. excluding natural
resource revenues) and public enterprise MINUS per cent of government 
revenue from aid AND per cent of government revenue from production of
‘point’ natural resources (oil, gas, minerals and mined diamonds).
The next step would be to see how far the resultant score correlates with some of
the more plausible and useful indicators of various concepts of state capacity,
using some of the components from data bases such as Polity IV and the World
Bank Governance Indicators. That process – and especially a careful case-by-
case check on apparently unusual or outlier cases – would give a good indication
of whether the basic intuition is correct, and whether it would be justifiable to do
more research in order to identify additional indicators. We suspect that an 
additional explanatory factor might be the extent to which particular regimes have
institutionalised support bases in the form of organised ruling parties, or party-like
groupings, which encourage political elites to cooperate and to solve their 
differences internally, so as to maintain political stability.31 (For the general 
argument, see Brownlee 2007). This is not to suggest that European aid policy is
likely to be actively supporting non-democratic regimes. We assume that 
democracy and civil rights will remain important foreign policy objectives. The
point is simply that, in order to work effectively with or channel resources to some
governments, they will require some basic political capacity: the (Westphalian)
capacity to rule their territories and populations in a relatively stable way. Non-
democratic governments that can do that are generally preferable to non-
democratic governments that cannot maintain order, and permit conflict and 
banditry – the actual alternative facing some poor parts of the world today.32
While the reason for focusing on public revenue is now well established, the 
elaboration and testing of corresponding indicators requires further research and
experimentation. A clear numerical indicator would help to bring about a shift from
an aid-centric to a tax-centric debate. Note that the concern here is not with
resource mobilisation as an objective in itself. The purpose of the suggested 
indicator is to concentrate attention on the relationships between citizens/
31 Conversely, it is likely that, even taking account of public revenue sources, basic state capacity is 
especially low in those countries where political elites are heavily exposed to the temptations to 
engage in illegal activities in general, and the narcotics trade in particular.
32 This conception of using government revenue sources as indicators of basic state capacity clearly 
links to our earlier discussion of ‘anchor countries’. Those larger potential anchor countries whose 
governments are funded from oil and gas revenues – notably Russia, Iran and Venezuela – tend to 
suffer from political instability, and appear less reliable as partners than, say, China, India or Brazil. 
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enterprises and governments – so essential for strengthening state capacity.33
Such a country classification, focused on the sources of public revenue, would be
of practical importance and help reorient the behaviour and incentives of 
governments and development agencies.
Appendix: National performance
indicators and rankings
1. African Governance Indicator 
2. Ageing Vulnerability Index 
3. AIDS Program Effort Index (API) 
4. Alternative Country-Risk Index (Indice de Riesgo Pais Alternativo – IRPA) 
5. APESMA Big Mac Index 
6. Assessing the Achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
7. Basic Capabilities Index (BCI) – Previously ‘Quality of Life Index’
8. Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) 
9. BIC3D Index 
10. Big Mac Index 
11. BradyNet Ratings Ladder 
12. Bribe Payers Index (BPI) 
13. Capital Access Index (CAI) 
14. CIRI Human Rights Dataset 
15. Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT) 
16. Climate Change Performance Index (CCPI) 
17. Commitment to Development Index (CDI) 
18. Composite Score of Risk – Business Risk Service (BRS) 
19. Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 
20. Countries at the Crossroads 
21. Country @ratings 
22. Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) 
23. Country Performance Assessment (CPA) 
24. Country Policy and Institutional Assessment and IDA Country Performance 
Ratings 
25. Country Risk Evaluation and Assessment Model (CREAM) Country Index 
26. Country Risk Monitoring Service 
27. Country Risk Rating 
28. CSGR Globalisation Index 
29. Dashboard of Sustainability 
30. Democracy Score (Nations in Transit Ratings) 
31. Disaster Risk Index (DRI) 
32. Ducroire / Delcredere Country Risks 
33. Early Motherhood Risk Ranking 
33 Useful indicators for internal and external resource mobilisation have been put forward by Sagasti 
et al. (2005), but their prime concern was development financing.
41
IDS WORKING PAPER 326
34. Ease of Doing Business 
35. E-Business Readiness Index 
36. Ecological Footprint 
37. Economic Freedom of the Word (EFW) Index 
38. Economic Vulnerability Index 
39. Education for all Development Index (EDI) 
40. E-Government Index 
41. E-Government Readiness Index 
42. EIU Business Environment Rankings 
43. EIU Country Risk Rating 
44. EIU World Wide Cost of Living Index 
45. Emerging Markets Bond Indices 
46. Environmental Degradation Index (EDI) 
47. Environmental Performance Index (EPI) 
48. Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI
49. Environmental Vulnerability Index (EVI) (In process) 
50. E-Participation Index 
51. E-Readiness Rankings 
52. ERG Country Classification 
53. Ethics Indices 
54. Ethno-linguistic and Religious Fractionalization Index and Political Instability
Index 
55. Eurochambres Economic Survey (EES) Indicators 
56. European Innovation Scoreboard (EIS) and Summary Innovation Index (SII) 
57. Failed States Index 
58. Financial Times Credit Ratings 
59. Food Insecurity
60. Forbes Capital Hospitality Index (FCHI) 
61. Foreign Direct Investment Confidence Index 
62. FORELEND – Lender’s risk rating 
63. Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) 
64. Gender Equity Index (GEI) 
65. Gender Gaps 
66. Gender Gaps Scores in Education 
67. Gender-related Development Index (GDI) 
68. G-Index (Globalization Index) 
69. G-Index (Globalization Index) 
70. Global Civil Society Index (GCSI) -pilot 
71. Global Climate Risk Index 
72. Global Competitiveness Index 
73. Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 
74. Global Hunger Index (GHI) 
75. Global Integrity Index 
76. Global Investment Prospects Assessment (GIPA) 
77. Global Natural Disasters Risk Hotspots 
78. Global Peace Index (GPI) 
79. Global Production Scoreboard 
80. Global Quality of Living 
81. Global Retail Development Index (GRDI)
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82. Global Risk Service 
83. Global Terrorism Index 
84. Governance Indicators 
85. Grey Area Dynamics (GAD) 
86. Happiness Index 
87. Happy Planet Index (HPI) 
88. High Tech Indicators (HTI) – Technological Standing 
89. Human Development Index (HDI) 
90. Human Poverty Index (HPI) 
91. Human Rights Commitment Index
92. Humanitarian Response Index 
93. Ibrahim Index of African Governance 
94. ICT Opportunity Index (replaces the Digital Access Index) 
95. Index Measuring the Strictness of Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) 
96. Index of Economic Freedom 
97. Index of Human Insecurity 
98. Index of Human Progress 
99. Index of Knowledge Societies (IKS) 
100. Index of Social Vulnerability to Climate Change (SVI) 
101. Index of State Weakness in the Developing World 
102. Innovation Capacity Index 
103. Institutional Investor Country Credit ratings 
104. Internal Market Scoreboard and Internal Market Index 
105. International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) Ratings – Composite Risk Rating 
106. International Index of Social Progress (ISP) 
107. Investment and Performance in the Knowledge Based Economy 
108. Inward FDI Performance Index 
109. Inward FDI Potential Index 
110. Latin American Index of Budget Transparency 
111. KOF Index of Globalization 
112. ITU Digital Access Index (DAI) 
113. Least Secure Countries 
114. Lisbon Scorecard 
115. Living Planet Index (LPI) 
116. McKinsey Global Confidence Index 
117. Major Military Spenders 
118. Media Sustainability Index (MSI) 
119. Millennium Challenge Account country rankings 
120. Mineral Extraction Risk Assessment (MERA) 
121. Mother’s Index 
122. National Biodiversity Index (NBI) 
123. Networked Readiness Index (NRI) 
124. Official Development Assistance (ODA) Rankings 
125. Offshore Location Attractiveness Index 
126. Opacity Index (O-Factor) 
127. Open Budget Index 
128. Outward FDI Performance Index 
129. Overall Health System Achievement Index 
130. Overall Health System Performance Index 
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131. Overall Market Potential Index 
132. Oxfam Survey of Donor Practices 
133. Peace and Conflict Instability Ledger 
134. Political and Economic Risk Map 
135. Political Rights and Civil Liberties Ratings 
136. Political Terror Scale (PTS) 
137. Polity IV Country Scores 
138. Pollution-Sensitive Human Development Index (HDPI) 
139. Press Freedom Index 
140. Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) 
141. Progress in International Reading Literacy Study (PIRLS) 
142. Pro-Poor Policy (PPP) Index 
143. Public Integrity Index 
144. Qualitative Risk Measure in Foreign Lending (QLM-FE) – Financial Ethics 
Index 
145. Quality of Life Index 
146. Quality of Workforce Index (QWI) 
147. Reproductive Risk Index 
148. Responsible Competitiveness Index 
149. Science and Technology Indicators 
150. Social Watch Scorecard – Thematic areas 
151. Sovereign Credit Rating (Fitch)
152. Sovereign Credit Rating (Moody)
153. Sovereign Credit Rating (Standard and Poor’s)
154. Sovereign Credit Rating (WMRC)
155. Sovereign Risk Rating 
156. Stability Index 
157. State Fragility Index 
158. Sustainability Index 
159. Sustainable Society Index (SSI) 
160. Tax Misery and Reform Index 
161. Technology Achievement Index 
162. The Observer Human Rights Index 
163. Total Wealth and Genuine Savings 
164. Tourism Competitiveness Monitor 
165. Trade and Development Index (TDI) 
166. Transnationality Index of Host Economies 
167. Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) 
168. Under Five Mortality Rank – U5MR (Child Welfare) 
169. Water Poverty Index (WPI) 
170. Wealth of Nations Triangle Index 
171. Welfare Index 
172. Wellbeing Indices 
173. World City Networks – Global Network Connectivity Rankings 
174. World Competitiveness Scoreboard 
175. World Cue PRO 
176. World Governance Assessment 
177. World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers Rankings 
178. World Press Freedom Ranking
Source: Bandura (2008).
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